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INTRODUCTION
Keeping abreast of decisions dealing with the law of judicial review
is of vital importance to the bench and bar. This article is a survey of
Florida court decisions concerning appeal and error and certiorari. It
covers decisions from 132 So.2d 341 to 155 So.2d 403, inclusive.1
Cases dealing with criminal law and workmen's compensation are not
included.
I. COURTS
Jurisdiction of state court where act of congress limits area to federal
supervision. When an Act of Congress purports to vest jurisdiction over
a given area in a federal agency, thereby excluding initial state control,
a state court does not have jurisdiction to grant relief pursuant to a
state statute.2
Appellate court must adjudicate each case on its merits. A circuit
court, acting as an appellate court, should not have affirmed a conviction
on the sole ground that the opinion of the district court of appeal in the
prosecution of another case settled all of the points raised on appeal.
Therefore, the case must be remanded to the circuit court to decide the
appeal on its own merits.'
Power of an appellate court to enter a trial court decree. An ap-
pellate court will not enter a decree which should have been given
by the trial court, as authorized under section 59.34 of the Florida Stat-
* Justice of the Florida Supreme Court (retired).
** Editorial Board Member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. The material in this survey includes cases from March 16, 1961, through August
31, 1963.
2. Scherer & Sons, Inc. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers, 142 So.2d 290
(Fla. 1962).
3. King v. State, 143 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1962) (review by certiorari).
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utes, in the absence of a showing that the trial court had refused to follow
or would not readily comply with the mandate of the reviewing court.
4
No direct appeal to supreme court from a municipal court. Article
5, section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution provides that appeals may
be taken directly to the supreme court from final judgment directly pass-
ing on the validity of a "state statute." However, a municipal ordinance
is not a "state statute" and, therefore, the supreme court did not have
jurisdiction of a direct appeal by defendants from a judgment of a muni-
cipal court passing upon the validity of a municipal ordinance. The ap-
pellee's motion to dismiss the appeal would be treated as a motion to
transfer the appeal to the circuit court for appropriate disposition.'
Determination that the application of a statute is unconstitutional
does not render that case fraught with great public interest. Article 5,
section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution provides that the supreme court
may review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal that
passes on a question certified by the district court to be of "great public
interest." A case is not fraught with "great public interest" when it in-
volves the determination that the application of a statute is unconstitu-
tional under the circumstances of the case.6
Jurisdiction of the supreme court on appeal. Article 5, sections 4(2)
and 5(3) of the Florida Constitution excepts from judgments and orders
appealable to district courts of appeal those from which appeals may be
taken directly to the supreme court. In Dade County v. Kelly,7 this pro-
vision was held to preclude an interlocutory appeal to the district court
when an appeal from the final decree was exclusively within the jurisdic-
tion of the supreme court.
Pursuant to article V, section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution, which
grants jurisdiction to the supreme court of a case where the constitution-
ality of a statute is questioned, the supreme court has jurisdiction of an
appeal when the effect of the decision of the district court of appeal is
to render doubtful the constitutionality of a statute affecting a class of
constitutional officers.8
An appeal from the final decision of a tfial court directly passing
upon the validity of a state statute should be brought directly to the
supreme court under article 5, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.'
The supreme court does not have jurisdiction of a direct appeal
from a decree which merely holds a statute unconstitutional as applied
4. Sullivan v. Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 132 So.2d 341 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
5. Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 134 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1961).
6. Stein v. Darby, 134 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1961).
7. 149 So.2d 382 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
8. Tyson v. Lanier, 154 So.2d 313 (Fla.' 1963).
9. Robinson v. State, 144 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1962).
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under the facts of the particular case at bar without determining the
validity of the statute per se.10
The fact that a complaint prays for a decree directly passing upon
the validity of state statutes and construing the alleged controlling pro-
visions of the Florida Constitution does not mean ipso facto that the
decree entered in such a cause has complied with the relief demanded
therein for the purpose of determining whether it is directly appealable
to the supreme court."
Appellate court should state grounds for reversal. An appellate
decision reversing a trial court should be supported by a majority opinion
for guidance of the trial court upon remand. The rule does not apply
where the trial court is affirmed because the necessity for guidance upon
remand is not then present.'
2
Questions "certified" should be addressed to court having appellate
jurisdiction. Florida Appellate Rule 4.6 authorizes a judge of the "lower
court" to certify a question or proposition of law "to the court for in-
struction." When a circuit court as a "lower court" seeks an answer to a
certified question, the certificate should be addressed to the appellate
court which would have jurisdiction to pass upon the question should it
be presented in a regular appellate proceeding. Any contrary interpreta-
tion would make it possible to obtain from the supreme court a deter-
mination of a proposition which otherwise would fall within the jurisdic-
tion of a district court of appeal. By such a device, jurisdiction of the
courts of appeal could be effectively circumvented.'
Subsequent appeal; when cause reversed and remanded to court of
appeal. An opinion of the supreme court, was properly adopted by
a district court of appeal as its own opinion, in accordance with a
mandate of the supreme court directing that the cause be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings and a decree consistent with the
supreme court's opinion. This opinion was held to operate on the trial
court's decree only under the mandate of the district court of appeal.
Therefore, an appeal from the new final decree entered by the trial court
would go directly to the district court of appeal and only then to the
supreme court if such an appeal were proper.' 4
Supreme court rule prevails over conflicting statute. Pursuant to
article 5, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, a rule adopted by the
supreme court pursuant to the constitution supersedes any legislative
10. Snedeker v. Vernmar Ltd., 139 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1962).
11. Green v. Peters, 140 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
12. State v. Leveson, 147 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1962).
13. Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka, 149 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1963).
14. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 152 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1963).
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enactment governing practice and procedure to the extent that the
statute and the rule may be inconsistent."5
The supreme court will not exercise jurisdiction when the decision
of the district court of appeal does not express a clear majority opinion.
When two judges of a district court of appeal favored affirmance on
entirely different grounds and one judge favored reversal, there was no
.majority opinion supporting the judgment of the lower court in order to
enable the supreme court to adjudicate the appeal. Consequently, juris-
diction of the cause was relinquished to the district court of appeal so
that it could clarify the majority view and eliminate the apparent ambi-
guities.' 6
Supersedeas, power of trial court to modify an order for. Trial courts
in Florida have the authority to modify an order for supersedeas and,
consequently, to permit substitution of the collateral posted in connec-




Order denying writ of mandamus, not appealable. An order granting
a motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus is an appealable "final
judgment" although the peremptory writ was never shown to have been
issued. The "final judgment" was issued when the court ordered the
issuance of the peremptory writ and not when the clerk issued the writ."
However, an order quashing an alternative writ of mandamus was held
not to be a final judgment and therefore was not appealable.' 9
"Rendition" of final decree. Pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 2.1-
(b), the final decree is not "rendered," for purposes of computing the
time to appeal, until the order denying the timely motion for a rehearing
is entered. °
Appeal from an order entered subsequent to a final decree. All orders
entered subsequent to a final decree are not necessarily interlocutory.
In a proper case an order entered after the final decree may of itself
constitute an adjudication so final in nature as to partake of the character
of a final decree, and may, therefore, sustain an appeal. Such an order
may be reviewed according to procedure relating to an interlocutory or a
final appeal.2 '
15. Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka, 149 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1963).
16. Solomon v. Sanitarians' Registration Bd., 147 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1962).
17. Dade-Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. Biscayne Kennel Club, 136 So.2d 669
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
18. Volusia County v. Eubank, 143 Sold 865 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
19. State v. Fink, 140 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
20. Pilgrim v. Melvin, 141 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
21. Shannon v. Shannon, 136 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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Neither directed verdict nor ruling on admissibility of evidence is
appealable. An order directing a verdict is not a final judgment from
which an appeal would lie, notwithstanding that final judgment was
rendered subsequent to the date of filing the notice of appeal. 22 An order
overruling an objection to the introduction of evidence is reviewable on
an appeal taken from the final decree, but such a ruling is not an appeal-
able interlocutory order.28
Motion to quash the appeal; burden of movant. On a motion to
quash and affirm upon the ground that the appeal is frivolous, the movant
must point out clearly and concisely the exact matter on which he bases
his conclusion that the questions raised are of no substance. To sub-
stantiate such a conclusion the movant must demonstrate that a bare
inspection of the record will readily disclose that the appeal is devoid of
merit.
24
Misprision in. the notice of appeal is not grounds for dismissal. An
error in stating in the notice of appeal filed by the plaintiff that the ap-
peal was taken by the defendant .(and designating the law firm which
signed the notice as "attorneys for defendant") constituted a harmless
mistake since no prejudice or inconvenience resulted to either party. The
purpose of the procedural rules-to effect the proper administration of
justice-justified the denial of a motion to dismiss the appeal.25
Weight given on appeal to findings of a probate judge. The findings
of a probate judge are given the same weight on appeal as the findings of
any other trier of fact. Such findings will not be disturbed on appeal un-
less there was a palpable misconception of the facts, or a manifest mis-
apprehension or misapplication of the law.26
When granting a mistrial equates granting of a new trial; grounds
not specified. The trial court refused to accept the jury's verdict and is-
sued an order which granted the plaintiff's motion for a mistrial, denied
the defendant's motion for a judgment on the verdict, and permitted the
plaintiff to proceed to a new trial. On appeal, the district court reversed
on the grounds that the order was in nature and effect an order granting
a new trial which was appealable, requiring the trial judge to give reasons
for granting a new trial.27
Scope of review on appeal in chancery. An appeal in chancery opens
the whole case for the consideration of the appellate court, and cross-
22. Ballard v. Hopkins, 142 So.2d 738 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
23. C. G. J. Corp. v. Engel, 135 So.2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
24. Morris v. Rabara, 145 So.2d 265 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
25. Watson v. Dedmon, 145 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
26. In re Winslow's Estate, 147 So.2d 613 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
27. A & P Bakery Supply & Equip. Co. v. Hexter & Son, Inc., 149 So.2d 883
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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assignments of error are unnecessary to entitle an appellee to relief or
reversal of a decree containing reversible error, provided that the re-
viewing court exercises its right to examine the entire case as presented
by the record.2"
No interlocutory appeal from an advisory order of a probate court.
An interlocutory appeal cannot be taken from an order of the county
judge's court in a probate matter when the order was largely advisory
and prescriptive of the course which the case should follow in the future.2 9
Specific rule controls over general rule. When several, rules pertain
to the same subject, they are to be construed together and in relation to
each other. An illustrative case reviewed a proceeding to remove an
executor. Florida Appellate Rule 5.9 is a general rule which provides that
if an order is in whole or in part other than a money judgment, order, or
decree, elements to be regarded in fixing amount and conditions of super-
sedeas bond shall be the cost of the action, of the appeal, interest,
damages for delay, use, detention, and depreciation. It was held in this
situation that Rule 5.9 must yield to Appellate Rule 5.3 (b), a specific
rule governing supersedeas bond in an appeal from an order removing
an executor. 0
A matter determined in a prior appeal is "law of the case." On its
first appeal, the plaintiff objected to the trial of an issue which it claimed
was not presented by the pleadings; the district court of appeal directed
the issue to be tried. Plaintiff then raised the identical issue on a sub-
sequent appeal, which was dismissed because a party is not permitted a
second review of a question determined on a previous appeal.8 '
Merger of appeals. When one defendant, after entry of summary
final decree for the plaintiff, filed notice of appeal naming all parties, and
when one week later the second defendant did likewise, the second de-
fendant's appeal was treated as a joinder in the first defendant's appeal
and was merged into and became part of the first appeal.82
Payment of costs prior to appeal. When a city, as an original plaintiff
in an action against a motorist for damage to city property, suffers a
money judgment against it on a counterclaim, it must pay costs and
assign error on the taxing of costs as a prerequisite to the right to appeal,
subject to an exemption excusing municipalities from filing a supersedeas
bond, notwithstanding article V, section 5(3) of the Florida Constitution
providing that such judgment is appealable "as a matter of right."38
28. City of Miami v. Lehman 134 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
29. In re Hortt's Estate, 149 So.2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
30. In re Cleary's Estate, 135 So.2d 428 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
31. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v..Carol Fla. Corp., 154 So.2d 339 (Fla. 3d Dist..1963).
32. Deerfield Beach Bank- v. Mager, 140 So.2d 120 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). . ,
33. City of Miami v. Murphy, 132 So.2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), cert. discharged, 137
So.2d 825 (Fla. 1962).
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However, when an appellant failed to comply with Florida Appellate Rule
3.2 (f), requiring the payment of taxed costs prior to the filing of an ap-
peal, and the appeal was ripe for final determination, such failure did
not require a summary dismissal of the appeal, and appellant was granted
time within which to comply, pay costs and interest or face dismissal.84
Correct judgment erroneously reached. The judgment of an inferior
tribunal will not be reversed on appeal because erroneous reasons were
applied in reaching a correct decision.85
Notice of appeal prior to entry of final judgment. A notice of appeal
filed by a party prior to the "rendition" by the trial court of a final judg-
ment cannot confer jurisdiction on the appellate court, and the appeal
will be dismissed ex mero motu.86
No direct appeal to the supreme court from an opinionless dismissal
by a district court of appeal. A decision of a district court of appeal can-
not be the subject of a direct appeal to the supreme court when the district
court dismissed without opinion or comment. The appeal in this case was
dismissed without prejudice to the appellant.87
Full appeal taken from an interlocutory order. Pursuant to Florida
Appellate Rule 4.2 (a), a post-decretal order was an "interlocutory de-
cree," not a "final decree," and the appeal therefrom should have been
taken under such a rule governing "interlocutory appeals."88
An interlocutory order, basic to the final decree, may support jurisdic-
tion. A direct appeal was taken to the supreme court for review of a sum-
mary judgment in a cause when the trial judge by interlocutory order
held a state statute unconstitutional. The appellee raised the jurisdictional
issue that, since the summary judgment itself did not contain a finding
regarding the statute's invalidity, no direct appeal to the supreme court
lies under article 5, section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution. The court
allowed the appeal on the ground that an appeal from a final judgment
brings up for review all interlocutory orders entered as a necessary step
in the proceedings below, when such interlocutory orders are assigned
as error and are basic to the final judgment and furnish jurisdictional
grounds therefor.89
III. RIGHT To REvIEw
Estoppel by accepting the benefits of a decree or judgment. In Car-
ter v. Carter,0 a wife who accepted the benefits granted to her under a
34. Adams v. Setzer's Super Stores, 145 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
35. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Green, 132 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1961).
36. Tom v. State ex rel. Tom, 143 So.2d 226 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
37. State ex rel. Emmanuel v. Cooper, 152 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1963).
38. Finneran v. Finneran, 137 So.2d 844 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
39. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Ass'n, 153 So.2d 722
(Fla. 1963).
40. 141 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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settlement agreement incorporated into the husband's divorce decree,
subsequently appealed the granting of the decree. The husband moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the wife had accepted the
benefits accruing to her under the final decree. The court dismissed the
appeal, with the following language: "It is a well established principle of
law prevailing in this state that where a party recovering a judgment or
decree accepts the benefits thereof voluntarily and knowing the facts,
he is estopped to afterwards seek a reversal of such judgment or decree
on appeal.
' 41
Effect of trial court erroneously taking judicial notice. When the
chancellor erroneously took judicial notice of a fact that was readily
susceptible of proof, and through understandable inadvertence or over-
sight such proof was omitted during the formal presentation before him,
the ends of justice would best be served by remanding the cause for
further testimony on that single issue.42
Filing of appeal prior to the adjudication of post-verdict motions.
On the taking of an appeal from a final judgment rendered prior to the
entry of a written order on the appellant's post-verdict motions, such
motions are waived or abandoned.
43
IV. PARTIES
A defendant cannot appeal a judgment in favor of a co-defendant. A
cross-claim in and of itself does not constitute an exception to the general
rule that a defendant cannot appeal a judgment in favor of a co-
defendant and against the original plaintiff. The judgment must prej-
udicially affect the cross-claim between the defendants in order to per-
mit this kind of appeal.44
Duties of appellant in perfecting the appeal. Notwithstanding the
ministerial duties that under the rules of appellate procedure are imposed
on court officials, the party suing out the appeal has the overall duty to
see that all things are done in due season to perfect the appeal in the
manner prescribed by the rules.45
Duty of counsel to file briefs for clients who are appellees. Counsel
will be well advised to perform the service of filing briefs on appeal on
behalf of appellee-clients. The trial judge is also entitled at least as a
matter of courtesy to have the active support of his rulings by those who
ostensibly influenced the result. at the trial level.46
41. Id. at 592-93.
42. R. Bernardo & Sons, Inc. v. Duncan, 147 So.2d 542 (Fla.. 1st Dist. 1962).
43. Bannister v. Hart, 144 So.2d 853 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
44. Otis Elevator Co. v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 137 So.2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
45. Moore v. Joseph, 137 So.2d 584 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962).
46. Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Motor Vehicle Comm'r 134 So.2d 40 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1961).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Satisfaction of joint and several liability by one party. When judg-
ments have been rendered against two parties who are jointly and sev-
erally liable on an obligation, a full satisfaction of one of the judgments
operates to release and satisfy the judgment rendered against the other."7
V. MAKING AND SAVING GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
Evidence excluded without proffer not reviewable. When counsel
for the appellant failed to proffer the testimony of a witness after objec-
tions to questions were sustained by the trial court, such matter is not
reviewable on appeal.
4 8
Exclusion of evidence for erroneous reason. Even though the trial
court's exclusion of testimony was based upon an erroneous reason, it
will not be disturbed on appeal when the exclusion was proper on a ground
other than that specified by the trial court.4 9
VI. PROCEDURE AND LIMITATION OF TIME
Appeal time 60 days, and not 30 days, from interlocutory order
granting new trial in eminent domain. The Appellate Rules do not au-
thorize an appeal from an order granting a new trial; however, Florida
Statutes section 59.04 does authorize an appeal from an order granting
a new trial. Section 73.14 of the Florida Statutes fixes a limitation of
30 days for an appeal from a final judgment in an eminent domain
proceeding, and section 59.08 of the Florida Statutes fixes a limitation of
60 days on the right to appeal. In Dean v. State Road Dep't,50 the su-
preme court held that the 60-day appeal time provided by section 59.08
expressly governs the appeal time of orders granting motions for new
trial in eminent domain proceedings.
Time for appeal commences to run from time of entry of nunc pro
tunc order and not from the day it is entered "as of." When a timely
motion for judgment n. o. v. is made with an alternative motion for a
new trial, a denial of the motion for a new trial does not by implication
overrule the n. o. v. motion. Thus, when the motion for judgment n. o. v.
is denied by a nunc pro tunc order (as of the time of the order denying
the motion for a new trial), the time for appeal commences to run from
the day of the entry of the nunc pro tunc order.51
47. Leo Jay Rosen Associates, Inc. v. Schultz, 148 So.2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
48. Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Ellis, 143 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
49. Hancock v. McDonald, 148 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
50. 156 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1963). The supreme court quashed a decision of the district
court of appeal, holding that an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a new
trial in eminent domain must be taken within 30 days since FLA. STAT. § 73.14 (1961)
limited the time to appeal from a final judgment in such proceedings to 30 days. Dean
v. State Road Dep't, 144 So.2d 867 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
51. Stupp v. Cone Bros. Contracting Co., 135 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
[VOL. XVIII
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Untimely filing of a motion with the court will not stay appeal time.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.4(d) provides that "All original papers,
copies of which are required to be served upon parties, shall be filed with
the court either before service or immediately thereafter." The appellant
served a motion for a new trial upon the adverse party within 10 days
after the rendition of the verdict as prescribed by Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 2.8(b), but did not file a copy thereof with the court until
two days after the last day of the prescribed period. However, the timely
service of the motion for a new trial controls because the language of the
rule is directory and not mandatory, and allows a reasonable time for
filing with the court.
52
VII. SUPERSEDEAS OR STAY
A timely motion for authority to appeal tolls time. In a habeas
corpus proceeding, the judge vacated the judgment and sentence, and
did not authorize an appeal as required by section 79.11 of the Florida
Statutes. The state moved for authority to appeal. Such a motion, season-
ably filed, operated as a stay which extended the time otherwise allowed
for an appeal.58
Effect of a supersedeas or stay upon a mandatory and a prohibitive
injunction. In Miami v. Cuban Vil-Age Co.,54 a prohibitive injunction
was issued restraining the city form interfering with the appellee's
business until further order of the court. Subsequently, the chancellor
entered a final decree granting to the appellee a mandatory injunction
directing the city to issue certain municipal licenses. After filing a notice
of appeal, which, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 59.14, operated as
an automatic stay of the decree appealed, the city threatened to arrest
the appellee for conducting its business without the necessary municipal
licenses. However, a supersedeas or stay of a final decree is effective to
prevent the operation of an executory mandatory injunction but is in-
effective to stay the operation of a self-executing prohibitive injunction.
Therefore, appellee was entitled to a constitutional writ to preserve the
status quo pending final determination of the appeal.
"Three additional days" when notice of hearing is mailed not appli-
cable to "filing" of notice of appeal. Florida Appellate Rule 3.4 (b), which
grants an additional three days for the service of a notice of appeal on
adverse parties when mail is used, does not apply to the strict jurisdic-
52. Miami Transit Co. v. Ford, 155 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1963). The supreme court quashed
a decision of the district court of appeal holding that the motion was not timely and
would not stay the running of the appeal time because the filing was not made "imme-
diately thereafter" as required by Rule 1.4(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
Miami Transit Co. v. Ford, 149 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
53. Griffith v. State ex rel. Crownover, 152 So.2d 818 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
54. 143 So.2d 69 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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tional requirements of Florida Statutes section 59.04 for filing notices
of appeal. Therefore dismissal of the appeal was required where the
notice of appeal was filed 61 days after rendition of the final decree
and the last day for filing and conferring jurisdiction was not a legal
holiday."
VIII. RECORD ON APPEAL
Scope of appellate review. Appellate review is confined to the record
on appeal. Hence, those portions of the appellee's brief which go out-
side the record should be stricken on motion.56
Presumption of completeness of the record on appeal. Unless the
record shows to the contrary, it shall be presumed that the record trans-
mitted to a reviewing court contains all proceedings in the lower court
material to the points presented. Therefore, pursuant to Florida Ap-
pellate Rule 3.6(e), those portions of the appellee's brief which are
dehors the record should be stricken on motion.57
Evidence to be included in record on appeal. Upon request of attor-
neys for the appellant, all the evidence which is adduced before a trial
judge should be included in the record sent up for review.5
Effect of an incomplete record on appeal. An appellant who desires
review of findings of fact must bring to the appellate forum the entire
record of the proceedings below. When the record on appeal fails to
include the entire testimony before the trial court, all findings of fact
must be affirmed.5 9
An appellate court is not authorized to consider and resolve assigned
error when the record on appeal is deficient because testimony allegedly
contrary to the holding below,6" or to the order appealed from,61 or to
the instructions given or denied by the trial court,62 was not sent up in
the transcript of record.
Failure to provide the appellate court with a transcript of the record
below. A decree appealed from is accorded a presumption of correctness
and will be affirmed unless the appellant successfully shows prejudicial
error in the record of the proceedings below. The appellant does not
satisfy the burden to make reversible error appear when it seeks review
of a decree based partially or wholly on testimony which is not in the
record on appeal."
55. In re Walker's Trust, 143 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d Dist 1962).
56. Sheldon v. Tiernan, 147 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
57. Maistrosky v. Harvey, 133 So.2d 103 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
58. Mitchell v. State, 142 So.2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
59. Phillips v. Blum, 139 So.2d 459 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
60. Widmeyer v. Olds, 144 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
61. Stuco Corp. v. Gates, 145 So.2d 527 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
62. Crosby v. Stubblebine, 142 So.2d 358 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
63. Lyden v. DePiera, 147 So.2d 573 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Downing v. Bird, 145
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Duty of appellant to avail the reviewing court of the record con-
nected with the asserted errors. An appellant's contentions cannot be
decided by the reviewing court when they require consideration of the
record which was before the trial judge and there is a failure to bring the
record before the appellate court. 4
Insufficiency of record on appeal from an order granting a directed
verdict. An order granting the defendant's motion for a directed verdict
at the close of all the evidence must be affirmed on appeal when the trans-
cript submitted to the appellate court contained only the testimony intro-
duced by the plaintiff, since the record was inadequate to review the trial
court's ruling that there was insufficient evidence of the defendant's
negligence to take the case to the jury.65
IX. BRIEFS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Insufficient assignment of error not reviewable on appeal. Florida
Appellate Rule 3.5 (c) relating to assignment of errors has been amended66
to read:
c. Essentials. The assignments or cross assignments of error
shall designate identified judicial acts which should be stated
as they occurred; grounds for error need not be stated in the
assignment.
The amended rule has been construed to mean that an assignment of
error must be addressed to an identified judicial act, "that it is the judi-
cial act which ... should be assigned as error and not the reasons why the
appellant considers the act to be legally erroneous . . ." and that grounds
or reasons for the error assigned would be covered by the legal points
raised in the brief. 7
Failure to include assignments of error in the appendix to the brief.
Errors allegedly committed by the lower- court cannot be considered on
appeal when the appendix to the brief contains nothing on which the
reviewing court can consider an assignment of error.
68
So.2d 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Pan American Metal Prods. Co. v. Healy, 138 So.2d 96
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
64. Gilson v. Murphy, Fearnley & Yawn, Inc., 151 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
65. Brown v. Householder, 134 So.2d 801 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
66. FLA. R. App. P. 3.5(c) formerly provided:
Contents. The assignments of error shall point out clearly and distinctly all
alleged errors of the lower court relied on for reversal. Where the alleged errors
are based on orders, evidence or charges such matters shall be specifically referred
to ....
Under this wording, an assignment of error merely complaining that the judgment
below was contrary to the evidence and to the law, or that the trial court erred in
entering its final decree, was insufficient under the rule and presented nothing for review.
See Gregg v. State Road Dep't, 140 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962); Hornsby v. Tingle,
134 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
67. Porter v. Childers, 155 So.2d 403, 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). See also 17 U. MIA L.
REV. 235, 304 (1963).
68. Union Trust Co. v. Baker, 143 So.2d 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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Unnecessary to include testimony in the appendix to the brief when
a separate transcript of the testimony is supplied. Under Florida Appel-
late Rule 3.7(f) (5), an appellant is not required to include any part of
the testimony in his appendix when the transcript of the testimony was
bound and paged separately.
69
Failure of appellant to furnish a copy of the transcript of record and
to include an appendix in the brief. When a copy of the record was served
after the filing of a motion to dismiss an appeal, no dismissal would lie
when there was no showing that the appellee was prejudiced thereby.
However, failure of the appellant to include an appendix in its brief
required the brief to be stricken with leave granted to file a new brief.7"
X. REVIEW
Scope of Review on a certified question. Pursuant to article 5,
section 4 of the Florida Constitution, the supreme court may explore the
entire record in arriving at its conclusion when a decision has been certi-
fied to it by a district court of appeal.71
Refusal to determine "certified questions" already decided. When
it appears that the trial court already has made a judicial determination
of the primary questions certified to the district court of appeal, there
is no basis for entertaining the certified questions and the certificate
will be denied.72
Presumption of correctness on appeal of the proceedings below. Ap-
pellant must have all matter necessary to sustain its contentions on ap-
peal included in the record because the reviewing court will presume that
the order appealed from was properly entered unless the record presented
demonstrates that it was not.
73
Strong presumption of correctness of an interlocutory order denying
motion to dismiss a complaint. The principle that all orders come to a
reviewing court with a presumption of correctness is especially strong
when applied to an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion
to dismiss, when the progress of the cause is delayed pending a review
of the trial judge's decision. For an appellate court to reverse the denial
of a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must appear clearly that the pleading
entirely fails to state a cause of action.74
69. Morris v. Rabara, 145 So.2d 265 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
70. Hazen v. James W. Johnson, Inc., 143 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
71. Scherer & Sons, Inc. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers, 142 So.2d 290
(Fla. 1962).
72. Johnson v. Southeast Title & Ins. Co., 148 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
73. Amphicar Corp. of America v. Gregstad Distrib. Corp., 138 So.2d 383 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1962).
74. Cravero Home Bldg. Co. v. Jaffe, 142 So.2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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Presumption of correctness on appeal of order granting a new trial.
Although an order of the trial court granting a new trial is entitled to
great weight by a reviewing court, it is not rendered impervious to appel-
late review by a statement of the trial judge that his judicial conscience
was shocked by the alleged excessiveness of the jury's verdict. There-
fore, such an order may be reversed by the reviewing court in an ap-
propriate appellate proceeding. 75
Court order granting a new trial must state grounds therefor. Pur-
suant to section 59.07(4) of the Florida Statutes and Rule 2.6(d) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the requirement that the order granting
a new trial shall state the grounds upon which the new trial is ordered
is mandatory. 76 For failure of the trial court to state the grounds upon
which an order granting a new trial was based, an order was required to
be reversed on appeal and remanded with directions to reinstate the
verdict and enter judgment therein, unless a motion in arrest of judg-
ment or a judgment n. o. v. be granted.
77
. Scope of review on appeal from an order granting a new trial. Pur-
suant to section 59.07(4) of the Florida Statutes, a court reviewing an
appeal from an order granting a new trial may consider only the grounds
assigned by the trial judge as a basis for his order.78 Therefore, cross-
assignments of error addressed to rulings of the trial court during the
progress of the trial may not be considered on appeal under the statute's.
limited scope of review, and a review of grounds not designated by the
trial judge as a basis for his order must await review on assignments of
error in an appeal from a final judgment.
79
Motion for a new trial not a prerequisite to review of order denying
motion for a directed verdict. A contention that the verdict is contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence cannot be reviewed on appeal in
the absence of a motion for a new trial; however, such a motion is not
necessary when the appellants question the complete absence of any evi-
dence to support the verdict and judgment by a motion for a directed
verdict at the close of all the evidence.80
Non-appealability of an order denying a petition for rehearing. An
order denying a petition for rehearing is in effect nonappealable when it
presents no issue for review other than those finally determined by a
decree from which no appeal was taken.8
75. Russo v. Clark, 147 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1962) (on rehearing).
76. Hammett v. Lyte Lyne, Inc., 150 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1963).
77. Hutchins v. City of Hialeah, 153 So.2d 864 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); A & P Bakery
Supply & Equip. Co. v. Hexter & Son, Inc., 149 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); Webb's
City, Inc. v. Lugerner, 138 So.2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Ponte v. Lattin, 135 So.2d
260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
78. Kraus v. Osteen, 135 So.2d 885 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
79. Messina v. Baldi, 135 So.2d 17 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
80. Sheehan v. Allred, 146 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
81. Oxford v. Polk Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 147 So.2d 603 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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An order setting aside on rehearing a summary final decree is not
appealable. An order setting aside on rehearing a summary final decree
is not an "appealable interlocutory order" within the purview of section
59.02 of the Florida Statutes because to determine the correctness thereof,
the appellate court would be required to consider the final decree and
record upon which it was predicated.82
Appeal taken before determination of appellee's petition for re-
hearing. A reviewing court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal taken by the
appellant while the appellee's petition for rehearing is pending. Such pro-
cedure would allow an appellant to deprive the appellee of a ruling on the
petition for rehearing and of the incidental right to cross-assign error.8"
"Clearly erroneous" rule not fully applied when the decision below
rendered solely on the pleadings and depositions. When the cause came
on for a final hearing on the stipulation of the parties that the trial judge
was to adjudicate the case solely on the pleadings and depositions, the
reviewing court was in the same position in examining the record as was
the trial judge. Consequently, presumptions as to the determination of
evidentiary matters were not as strong on the record as on one which
presented conflicting testimony heard by the trier of facts.84
Court can review only the judgment explicitly appealed from. The
trial court, with the consent of counsel, submitted separate verdict forms
for a complaint and a counterclaim, and entered two judgments. When
the plaintiff appealed only from the judgment on the complaint, the
appellate court could not consider claims which went exclusively to the
judgment on the counterclaim.85
Notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction of the cause to the appellate
court. The trial judge properly denied an application for leave to file
an answer and for a rehearing, when the party who made the application
had already appealed to the supreme court, because notice of appeal
transferred complete jurisdiction in the cause to the supreme court, and
the party who made the application abandoned the petition for rehearing
by having filed a notice of appeal.86
No appellate review of a decree not made the subject of the notice
of appeal. An appellate court cannot determine the correctness of the
denial of a motion to modify a decree if the final decree to be considered
and the record upon which it is predicated have not been made the subject
of a notice of appeal.87
82. Jones v. Wilson, 146 So.2d 784 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
83. Edelbut Constr. Co. v. Free, 149 So.2d 360 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
84. L & S Enterprises, Inc. v. Miami Tile & Terrazzo, Inc., 148 So.2d 299 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1963).
85. Karden v. Hatfield, 143 So.2d 208 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
86. State v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 134 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1961).
87. Taborsky v. Mathews, 137 So.2d 880 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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Appealability of a "split" judgment. When the plaintiff sues several
defendants, a partial or "split" judgment dismissing the suit against less
than all of the defendants without permitting the plaintiff to amend the
complaint is an appealable final judgment. 88
Judgment of dismissal res judicata as to the complaint; not the
cause of action. The court in Hardee v. Gordon Thompson Chevrolet,
Inc.,89 construed amended Rule 1.35(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure. It held that in sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action, it was not error to dismiss the complaint
"with prejudice" because the complaint was in fact insufficient, for the
ruling was not on plaintiff's cause of action. The court in effect held that
the judgment of dismissal was res judicata on the sufficiency of the com-
plaint to state a cause of action, "but the dismissal does not constitute an
adjudication on the merits of any other cause of action plaintiff may
have on any separate or different theory of law." 90
XI. DISMISSAL
Dismissal as to a party is a final decree. A decree dismissing a cause
as to named defendants with prejudice is a "final decree" as distinguished
from an "interlocutory decree," because it terminates the litigation as
to them.9
Order sustaining motion to dismiss is not a dismissal or an appeal-
able final judgment. When a motion to dismiss was granted upon the sole
ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action and the only
part that could be considered a judgment was the lower court's order
granting the "motion" with prejudice, the appeal must be dismissed sua
sponte for lack of a final judgment. 2
XII. CERTIORARI
Jurisdiction of the supreme court on a petition for certiorari. Pur-
suant to article 5, section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution, the supreme
court has jurisdiction of a petition for certiorari to review the decision
of a district court of appeal when such a determination conflicts with
the rule of other supreme court casesY3
"Class" of constitutional or state officers, construed. The purpose
88. Evin R. Welch & Co. v. Johnson, 138 So.2d 390 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
89. 154 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
90. For decisional law unimpaired by statute or rule of court see Rice v. White,
147 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). See also RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 850(c); Barns
& Mattis, Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U. MiAMI L. REv. 276,
286, n.33 (1963).
91. McMullen v. McMullen, 145 So.2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
92. Thatcher v. Sullivan, 138 So.2d 532 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
93. Oka v. Cole, 145 So.2d 233 (Fla. 1962).
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of article 5, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, giving the supreme
court jurisdiction to review by certiorari any decision of a district court
of appeal that affects a "class" of constitutional or state officers, is to
permit the supreme court to review a decision which directly affects one
state officer and in so doing similarly affects other state officers in the
same categoryf
4
Common law certiorari is available only where the appellate remedy
is inadequate. It is only in exceptional cases, when the remedy by appeal
will be inadequate, that an appellate court will exercise its discretionary
power to issue the common law writ of certiorari in an action at law. 5
Scope of review on common law writ of certiorari. Certiorari is a
discretionary writ, which may not be employed to reweigh or to reevaluate
evidence, but can be used by an appellate court to examine the record in
order to determine whether the lower tribunal had before it competent
substantial evidence to support its findings and judgment according to
the essential requirements of the law."
Certiorari: supreme court's scope of review, when granted. On
certiorari granted by the supreme court, its scope of review extends to a
determination of whether the opinion and judgment of the lower court
is correct, which may involve a consideration of non-jurisdictional
grounds.97 Furthermore, the supreme court can examine the trial court
record and measure the correctness of the district court's decision by the
court's own conclusion based upon such an examination. 8
Certiorari will be denied when appellate review is available. A writ
of certiorari does not lie when an order dismissing plaintiff's cause for
improper venue could be reviewed by interlocutory appeal. Since the
petition for a writ of certiorari may not be treated as an appeal, it must
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 9
An appeal of an interlocutory order may be treated as a petition for
certiorari. Section 59.45 of the Florida Statutes provides:
Misconception of remedy; supreme court. If an appeal be im-
providently taken where the remedy might have been more
properly sought by certiorari, this alone shall not be ground for
dismissal; but the notice of appeal and the record thereon shall
be regarded and acted on as a petition for certiorari duly pre-
sented to the supreme court.
94. Florida State Bd. of Health v. Lewis, 149 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1963).
95. Flagler Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Whiting, 148 So.2d 555 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
96. Cast-Crete Corp. v. Prater, 134 So.2d 813 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Nugent v.
Florida Hotel & Restaurant Comm'n, 147 So.2d 606 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
97. Giblin v. City of Coral Gables, 149 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1963); Pan Am. Bank of Miami
v. Alliegro, 149 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1963).
98. James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961) ; Confederation of Canada Life Ins. Co.
v. Vega y Arminan, 144 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1962).
99. Tel Service Co. v. Hendricks, 139 So.2d 436 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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A district court has construed this provision to mean that appeals
seeking review of an interlocutory order in a common law action may be
treated as petitions for certiorari. 10
Review of interlocutory orders at law by certiorari. Ordinarily cer-
tiorari will not issue to review interlocutory orders at law which are
reviewable on an appeal from a final judgment. However, certiorari is
the proper remedy when the interlocutory order may reasonably be held
to cause material injury throughout the subsequent proceedings for which
a remedy by appeal will be inadequate.' 0'
Effect of a denial of certiorari. In the landmark case of Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished the rule that a denial of certiorari carries with it no implication
whatever regarding the views of the Court on the merits of the case. The
Florida supreme court followed this view in Collier v. City of Home-
stead.0 3
However, the Florida court in Hamel v. Danko, '0 4 decided subse-
quent to Collier, declared unconstitutional section 59.021 of the Florida
Statutes, which provided that denial of a petition for certiorari shall
have no greater force and effect than a denial of a further exercise of
jurisdiction. It said this was an unconstitutional invasion by the legisla-
ture of functions exclusively vested in the judiciary, and held that a
denial of certiorari establishes the law on the issues denied review.
However, in the subsequent case of Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Bell, °5 the court followed Collier and implicitly adopted the United
States Supreme Court view when it stated:
While it is so well established as not to require explana-
tion, we point out here again that denial of certiorari by an ap-
pellate court cannot be construed as a determination of the
issues presented in the petition therefor and cannot be utilized
as precedent or authority for or against the propositions urged
or defended in such proceedings.
The most recent Florida decisions follow this rule.'06
Denial of petition for certiorari appealable as final judgment. The
denial by a circuit court of a petition for a writ of certiorari to review
100. Lovi v. North Shore Bank, 137 So.2d 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
101. Suez Co. v. Hodgins, 137 So.2d 231 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
102. 338 U.S. 912 (1949).
103. 81 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1955).
104. 82 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1955).
105. 116 So.2d 617, 619 (Fla. 1959).
106. Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. Harris, 134 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1961); Allen v. City
of Miami, 147 So.2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); State v. Edwards, 135 So.2d 889 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1961).
1963]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the judgment of an administrative board is an appealable final judgment
within the jurisdiction of the district court of appeal.0 7
Certiorari to review a conflict created by an appellate court's mis-
interpretation of the case at bar. The supreme court will grant a writ of
certiorari to the district court of appeal on the ground that a decision
of the district court created a conflict by erroneously accepting an earlier
supreme court decision as controlling.'08
Procedure for obtaining certiorari when a conflict of decisions exists.
Under article 5, section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution, a petition for
certiorari may be granted on the ground of a conflict between the decision
sought to be reviewed and a decision of another district court of appeal
or of the supreme court on the same point of law. However, the granting
of the petition is not a commitment that the court has jurisdiction but
rather indicates that the advice of counsel on the question of jurisdiction,
as well as on the merits, is desired." 9
Test used to determine the supreme court's jurisdiction by certiorari
in a conflict situation. The test of the supreme court's jurisdiction, under
article 5, section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution, to review by certiorari
a decision of a district court of appeal which allegedly conflicts with a
prior decision of the supreme court on the same point of law, is not
measured by the supreme court's view regarding the correctness of the
decision of the district court. Rather, it depends on whether the district
court's decision, if permitted to stand, would be out of harmony with a
prior decision of the supreme court on the same point, thereby generating
confusion and instability among precedents."10
Untimely petition for certiorari does not stay the proceedings below.
Although a petition for certiorari filed after the expiration of the required
fifteen-day period was not timely filed, and therefore did not automatically
stay the proceedings in the lower court, the supreme court ordered a
stay when the district court of appeal certified that its decision passed
upon a question of great public interest."'
107. Morris v. City of Hialeah, 140 So.2d 615 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
108. McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962).
109. Fusco v. Heymann, 139 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1962).
110. Kyle v. Kyle, 139 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1962).
111. City of Coral Gables v. Burgin, 138 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1962).
